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Florence Brooks Whitehouse was a prominent suffrage leader in Maine in the
1910s. Originally a member of the Maine Woman Suffrage Association, White-
house became the leader of the Maine branch of the National Woman’s Party,
which used more radical tactics and espoused immediate and full suffrage for
women. Courtesy of the Sewall-Belmont House & Museum, Washington DC.
FLORENCE BROOKS WHITEHOUSE
AND MAINE’S VOTE TO RATIFY
WOMEN’S SUFFRAGE IN 1919
BY ANNE GASS
In 1919, Maine faced an unusual conflict between ratifying the nine-
teenth amendment to the United States Constitution that would grant
full voting rights to women, and approving a statewide suffrage referen-
dum that would permit women to vote in presidential campaigns only.
Maine’s pro-suffrage forces had to head off last-minute efforts by anti-
suffragists to sabotage the Maine legislature’s ratification vote. Led by
Florence Brooks Whitehouse, with support from Alice Paul and other
National Woman’s Party organizers, suffragists fought down to the wire
to ensure that Maine became the nineteenth state to ratify the federal
amendment. Anne B. Gass is an independent researcher and is the great
granddaughter of Florence Brooks Whitehouse. She led the effort to get
Whitehouse inducted into the Maine Women’s Hall of Fame in 2008,
and has recently completed a longer work on Whitehouse’s suffrage ac-
tivities, entitled Voting Down the Rose: Florence Brooks Whitehouse
and Maine’s Fight for Woman’s Suffrage.
IN 1919, as the question of extending voting rights to women was de-bated nationally, Maine suffragists had their own debate on this is-sue. While they agreed that action was necessary to gain the vote for
women, they were divided over strategy. Some suffragists believed that
women’s suffrage should only be enacted through a change to the U.S.
Constitution, giving women the right to vote in all elections immedi-
ately. They also supported demanding the vote through more assertive
means such as picketing. Other suffragists believed that states should
have the right to decide whether women voted, and they accepted grad-
ual advances such as giving women voting rights in presidential elec-
tions only. They also believed women should merely ask for, not de-
mand, the right to vote. This divide over strategy led to an unusual
circumstance in Maine politics in 1919: Maine’s governor Carl Milliken
had to decide whether to schedule a vote to ratify the federal suffrage
amendment passed by Congress (to give women full voting rights), or to
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delay ratification until after a citizen’s referendum on partial suffrage for
women was held. Maine’s anti-suffragists, men and women opposed to
women’s suffrage, attempted to use this divide to prevent any form of
woman suffrage from being enacted at all. Maine’s two different suffrage
choices, through federal amendment or state action, reflected deep divi-
sions in strategy at the national level. The two primary national suffrage
organizations were the National Woman’s Party (NWP) led by Alice
Paul, and the National American Woman Suffrage Association
(NAWSA) led by Carrie Chapman Catt. Formed in 1913, the NWP fo-
cused on the passage of an amendment to the U.S. Constitution through
congressional action, in part by holding the political party in power re-
sponsible for its failure to advance the measure. NAWSA preferred to get
women’s suffrage passed at the state level until there was sufficient sup-
port for a federal amendment. Its organizers had employed this ap-
proach for decades with some success, and they were bitterly opposed to
Paul’s political activism.1 The inability of these two organizations to
unite behind a single suffrage strategy divided loyalties at the state level
and hampered the effectiveness of local organizing efforts, ultimately
placing the outcome of Maine’s ratification vote in jeopardy. Yet in the
final hours of the campaign, it took the more aggressive tactics em-
ployed by Florence Brooks Whitehouse and the NWP to persuade the
Maine legislature to approve the federal amendment. Asking for the vote
only got women so far; demanding the vote, even if it meant violating
societal norms of proper female behavior, was necessary in order for suf-
fragists to achieve their goals.
Florence Brooks Whitehouse was one of the most important leaders
of Maine’s suffrage movement in the closing years of the struggle. Flo-
rence Brooks was born in 1869 in Augusta, where she also spent her
formative years. She married Robert Treat Whitehouse in 1894, and the
couple moved to Portland, where Florence pursued a writing career. She
published two novels with Little, Brown & Company, as well as numer-
ous short stories and plays.2 Robert was a promising young attorney
who began his career in private practice and later became the United
States Attorney for Cumberland County. Both Florence and Robert were
part of Portland’s progressive movement in the early twentieth century,
supporting improved public education and sanitation and combating
prostitution. Their work convinced them that attaining voting rights for
women was critical to enacting the economic, political, and social re-
forms central to the progressive movement.
Occupied with her writing career and with raising their three sons,
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Whitehouse sometimes gave public speeches on the topic of women’s suffrage.
This poster announced two speeches that she gave in an unspecified town on
October 26, 1916. Maine Historical Society Collections.
Florence did not join the Maine Woman Suffrage Association (MWSA)
until 1913, when it was sorely in need of new leadership. She quickly
rose to prominence as a suffrage speaker and organizer. MWSA was affil-
iated with NAWSA, which held that women should ask politely for the
vote rather than demand it, and decried tactics which strayed outside
conventionally-held standards of womanly behavior. For decades
NAWSA had utilized a state-level approach to winning suffrage. Yet by
1913, only nine states and one territory had granted women the right to
vote, and these victories came at a high price. Between 1870 and 1910
suffragists across the country had mounted 480 campaigns in thirty-
three states to get the question in front of voters. Only fifty-five of these,
about 11 percent, were successful in getting referendums approved by
state legislatures, and only two states actually approved suffrage in this
way.3 Still, four million women of voting age lived in equal suffrage
states, all of them located in the western part of the country, and presi-
dential candidates were beginning to take notice.4
By contrast, Alice Paul and Lucy Burns established the National
Woman’s Party (NWP) in order to focus exclusively on passing a woman
suffrage amendment to the United States Constitution.5 Both Paul and
Burns had worked with Emmeline Pankhurst and the suffragettes in
Britain, and had used the types of militant tactics (such as breaking win-
dows and public demonstrations) that NAWSA leaders abhorred.
Founded in Washington, D.C., in 1913, by 1915 the NWP was reaching
out to states across the country to obtain support from like-minded
women. In the summer of 1915 labor activist Florence Kelley worked
with Florence Brooks Whitehouse to found the Maine branch of the Na-
tional Woman’s Party, which Whitehouse led from its inception. More
than any other Maine suffragist, Whitehouse was associated with the
NWP’s radical tactics, such as picketing President Woodrow Wilson out-
side the White House gates and elsewhere. As part of the NWP’s strategy,
she campaigned against Democrats because their party refused to sup-
port the federal suffrage amendment. Her public support of the NWP
earned her local notoriety and the opprobrium of her former colleagues
at MWSA.6
In 1919, MWSA was led by Anne Gannett, whose husband Guy was
a prominent businessman and a state senator from Augusta. It was Guy
Gannett who had introduced the presidential suffrage bill in the legisla-
ture in early 1919, where it met little opposition.7 The Gannets and the
Whitehouses moved in the same social circles; Florence and Anne had
been friends and had worked together in MWSA. They parted company,
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however, in October 1917 when police crackdowns on the NWP pickets
resulted in lengthy jail terms. “To me the things they are doing are per-
fectly awful,” Anne wrote Florence. “I can’t be a part of it even in the
smallest way because to me it is all wrong.”8
Maine was one of eight states in 1919 in which NAWSA and its local
affiliates supported presidential suffrage campaigns, even though the
U.S. House of Representatives had approved the federal amendment for
full woman suffrage and the measure lacked only one vote for passage in
the U.S. Senate. Unlike NWP, which continued to focus on passing the
federal amendment, NAWSA was willing to accept half-measures that
supported any progress towards woman suffrage.9
The NWP was held responsible by the mainstream press and other
opinion leaders for the disastrous outcome of Maine’s only statewide
special referendum for full woman suffrage, which took place on Sep-
tember 10, 1917. The pro-suffrage forces lost the referendum by a two-
to-one margin, a much worse showing than most observers had ex-
pected. The consensus was that the NWP pickets in Washington had
generated so much negative publicity that the men of Maine were thor-
oughly disgusted and believed women undeserving of the franchise.
Other possible explanations included voter apathy, Maine’s social con-
servatism, and the distraction of World War I, which the United States
had entered in April. Still, the pickets were easy to blame, and at its very
next meeting MWSA passed a resolution condemning them as “injuri-
ous to the suffrage cause.”10 Florence had campaigned vigorously for the
statewide suffrage referendum in 1917, but following its defeat she re-
signed from MWSA and devoted herself exclusively to working for the
federal suffrage amendment under the auspices of the NWP.11 She had
seen firsthand that the state-by-state approach favored by NAWSA was
agonizingly slow, and demeaning as well. In state campaigns women
spent thousands of hours begging men for a civil right that should have
been theirs as a matter of course. A federal amendment enfranchising
women was a much more direct path and avoided the drudgery and ex-
pense of endless state campaigns.
Moreover, as events unfolded in Congress, Maine was in a position
to play a decisive role in winning the vote. The U.S. House of Represen-
tatives passed the federal amendment in January 1918 with all four
members of Maine’s delegation voting in favor. The Senate proved more
intractable, however, and as the months dragged by into 1919 suffragists
were still one vote shy of the total they needed to get the measure
through. Alice Paul thought that Maine’s senator, Frederick Hale, might
Florence Brooks Whitehouse 
supply the missing vote, since he was on record as supporting suffrage,
but he refused to vote in favor of the federal amendment. In the summer
of 1917 he had publicly promised Florence that he would be bound by
the outcome of Maine’s statewide special suffrage referendum.12 Since
the voters had defeated it so decisively Hale maintained he had no choice
but to vote against the federal amendment, at least in that session of
Congress. Florence worked closely with Alice Paul and the NWP in 1918
and 1919 to find ways to convert Senator Hale. Together they organized
letter writing campaigns, brought well-known pro-suffrage speakers to
Maine, and persuaded three-quarters of Maine’s state legislators to sign
a petition calling on Hale to change his vote.13
It was at this point that Guy Gannett quietly introduced a presiden-
tial suffrage bill into the Maine Senate on MWSA’s behalf.14 Florence
found out about it only after the fact, and was quite irritated that MWSA
chose this route when the federal amendment seemed just months away
from passage, and the Maine legislature appeared likely to ratify it. For
eighteen months MWSA chapters had done very little but raise money
for the Red Cross, and they had long since given up trying to convert
Senator Hale.15 However, Guy Gannett must have realized that his fellow
lawmakers would support partial suffrage, so MWSA encouraged him to
introduce the bill. It sailed through the legislature during the winter of
1919, easily attracting enough support to pass.16
On June 4, 1919, the U.S. Senate finally approved the federal amend-
ment with exactly the two-thirds vote required for passage. The missing
vote did not come from Senator Hale but from Senator Edward Gay of
Louisiana. Once the deciding vote had been obtained, Hale bravely
called a press conference to announce his decision to change his vote in
favor, wiring Florence the same day, “I shall vote for the Federal Amend-
ment.”17 Florence was furious that the local press praised him for his vi-
sion and commitment to suffrage, ignoring the fact that his vote was su-
perfluous.18
Through its easy approval of presidential suffrage the Maine legisla-
ture had signaled that ratification would encounter little opposition, but
there was a potential wrinkle. The anti-suffragists, or “antis,” those op-
posed to woman suffrage, were collecting signatures on a petition to
send the presidential suffrage bill to the voters. They needed to get
10,000 signatures, which was a substantial hurdle, but since they had
money to pay signature gatherers there was a strong likelihood they
would succeed. The antis hoped to force the bill to referendum, piggy-
backing on a special election tentatively scheduled for early September
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1919. If Mainers voted down presidential suffrage before the state legis-
lature met to ratify the federal amendment, antis could claim with some
justification that the state did not want to enfranchise its women. This
might persuade lawmakers to oppose the federal amendment. The chal-
lenge, then, was to delay the timing of the presidential suffrage referen-
dum vote and bring the legislature back into special session as quickly as
possible so that it could act first on the federal amendment.19
Suffragists were fortunate that Maine’s governor, Carl E. Milliken,
was a staunch ally and was watching the progress of signature gathering
for the presidential suffrage referendum very closely. Maine had held
only six special sessions since the state was organized in 1820 and Mil-
liken was unwilling to schedule another one just for suffrage, especially
as the state was still recovering financially from World War I.20 If there
was other legislative business, however, it would be easy to bring the law-
makers back to Augusta and urge them to ratify immediately. Happily, it
looked as though there would be other business, and he was tentatively
planning a special session for either September or October. Florence
kept in close contact with Milliken and his staff as they waited to see
whether the antis could gather enough signatures to force the presiden-
tial suffrage bill to referendum vote, as they would need to move quickly
if that occurred.21
By early July, Maine’s antis had succeeded in collecting 12,000 signa-
tures, many more than the 10,000 needed to force the presidential suf-
frage bill to referendum. A citizen’s referendum on presidential suffrage
might not have stimulated much interest among the voters by itself, but
the antis had been very clever. In January 1919, the Maine legislature rat-
ified the eighteenth amendment to the U.S. Constitution to help enact
national prohibition. The antis joined with the “wet” forces in the peti-
tion drive, attempting to force a referendum not just on the suffrage
question but on ratification of national prohibition as well. Joining the
two issues together drew enough support for both to succeed.22
Citizens in many other states also objected to their legislatures ratify-
ing prohibition, and since the suffrage amendment followed immediately
it fueled this debate as well. Some people unquestionably opposed prohi-
bition, suffrage, or both, but the larger issue was the tension between
states’ rights and federal rights that had been present from the country’s
beginning. States’ rights proponents did not deny that the U.S. Constitu-
tion provided a vehicle for amending it. They simply believed that issues
such as prohibition or suffrage were not the proper purview of the federal
government; the states should decide on these issues individually.
Florence Brooks Whitehouse 
Furthermore, the phrase “government of the people, by the people,
for the people,” uttered by President Abraham Lincoln in his “Gettys-
burg Address,” had become a rallying cry for many who fought against
the usurpation of individual rights by state and federal governments.
These believers promoted the citizen referendum process as the ultimate
expression of true democracy, maintaining that any controversial legis-
lation ought to be referred to the people, giving legislatures little power
to govern. State senator Alfred Ames articulated this position in Febru-
ary 1919 when he moved to amend Maine’s presidential suffrage bill to
require a referendum vote:
This law should be submitted to the people of this State, and we
should not assume the great responsibility of determining so great a
question. It was for such determination that the referendum was cre-
ated – that the people might rule. If we withhold the referendum from
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Whitehouse was present on February 23, 1917, when Governor Carl E. Milliken
called for a special election on the issue of women’s suffrage. The election oc-
curred in September 1917 and proved disastrous for suffragists. Whitehouse is
pictured standing over Milliken’s left shoulder. Anne Gannett is to her left.
Maine Historical Society Collections.
this measure we deny to the people the right to determine for them-
selves how they may perform one of the highest duties of citizenship.23
In other words, the people of Maine (i.e., male voters), not their
elected representatives, should have the right to decide whether women
should be given the right to vote. According to Senator Ames, that was
the whole point of the referendum process, to give voters the chance to
weigh in on matters of such great importance. Ames’ motion was de-
feated, which is why the antis were forced to gather signatures to send it
to referendum.
Opponents argued that overuse of the citizen’s referendum should
be avoided. Senator LeRoy Folsom of Norridgewock, for example, com-
plained that “when no argument prevails, legislators are becoming prone
to invoke the referendum…. Legislators are liable to become addicted to
the habit of a referendum, referendumitis, so to speak.” 24 When most
voters were not concerned about an issue, or were actively in favor as
Folsom believed was the case with presidential suffrage, the legislature
should simply act on it and move on to other business. Still, the impor-
tance of “letting the people decide” was the Maine anti-suffragists’ most
effective argument in opposing ratification of the federal suffrage
amendment.
Governor Milliken made a last-ditch effort in July to head off the
presidential suffrage referendum by referring the issue to the Maine
Supreme Court, asking for a ruling on whether the legislature could act
independently on both constitutional amendments or if they were cov-
ered by the initiative and referendum clauses contained in Article 4 of
Maine’s constitution. Maine was one of twenty-two states that permitted
sending federal amendments to voters for approval after their state legis-
latures had acted on them. These clauses had never been challenged in
court. National prohibition and woman suffrage prompted the exami-
nation of this larger constitutional question of whether states could uni-
laterally change the process by which the federal constitution was
amended. Many other states across the country were challenging the
amendment process, and the issue would ultimately be brought to the
U.S. Supreme Court for a final ruling.25
Suffragists nationwide watched anxiously to see how the Maine
Supreme Court would rule on this issue. If Maine’s court ruled that both
amendments were subject to the referendum process then the pro-suf-
frage forces could be in for an extended battle, as even states that had al-
ready ratified the federal amendment might be forced back into referen-
dum campaigns. Considerable relief and rejoicing followed when
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Maine’s highest court ruled unanimously that prohibition, as an amend-
ment to the federal constitution, was not subject to Maine’s initiative
and referendum process. The presidential suffrage measure, however,
would have to go before the people of Maine since it was an action of the
state legislature.26
MWSA leaders, Florence insisted, were “proving again how deadly
lacking in political acumen they were”; they had mounted no counter-
campaign to dissuade people from signing the presidential suffrage ref-
erendum petition.27 It was fortunate for the suffragists that Maine’s po-
litical leadership remained firmly in support of ratification. Governor
Milliken, legislative leaders, and even Senator Hale publicly pledged that
Maine would be among the states that ratified. Ironically, Hale now
claimed to be a staunch supporter of women’s suffrage, although his sin-
gle vote in the Senate could have secured its passage months earlier than
actually occurred.28
Fortunately, Maine state law required at least a four-month period
after the referendum signatures were submitted before the vote could
take place, which bought time for ratification of the federal amendment
by the state legislature. Governor Milliken still hoped ratification could
occur at a special session that would take place in late fall, as long as a
transportation bond issue passed at a special election in September. If
the bond issue failed the Governor remained unwilling to call a session
solely to ratify the federal amendment. He would do so only if other
governors agreed to do the same in their states, or if Maine’s vote was
critical to gaining the required number of states nationally. Still, he
seemed to understand the danger of waiting to ratify until after the pres-
idential suffrage referendum took place, and promised to watch the situ-
ation. Based on the relative ease with which the anti-suffragists had se-
cured 12,000 signatures, Whitehouse was convinced the referendum
would be defeated, so she was very anxious for the legislature to ratify
the federal amendment first.29
Alice Paul shared Florence’s determination that the special session
should be scheduled as quickly as possible. She hoped that it might be
possible to secure the thirty-six states needed for ratification as early as
September 1919; if this occurred, then women would have ample time to
register for the upcoming November elections. This may have been sim-
ply a high-pressure tactic on Paul’s part to wring greater effort from her
staff and state branches, since the resistance in many states to scheduling
special sessions suggested that this hope was doomed from the start.
Still, it did add a sense of urgency to the campaign and gave suffragists a
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new excuse to hold public meetings and pressure their politicians. Paul
thought she could arrange to have a prominent speaker travel to Maine
to help draw crowds.30 Florence wanted NWP’s National Political Chair-
man, Abby Scott Baker, with whom she had become friendly on her pre-
vious visits to Maine. “I want you and not some one else,” she wrote
Baker, “and hope you will use your influence to get here. It will be won-
derful to see you again and we will get in a little fun besides. Write me
when and I will meet you.” Florence hoped to tour the state for several
days with Baker, going at least as far as Augusta and perhaps up to Ban-
gor as well. While she still doubted it was possible to raise much money
or even to draw much of a crowd to meetings, Florence believed that
Baker’s experience would bring a fresh perspective to interviews with
legislators and, most importantly, with Governor Milliken. “The Gover-
nor knows me too well,” Whitehouse told Baker. Baker might move him
as no one else could. 31
Baker was detained by some personal affairs until mid-August 1919,
but in the interim, Paul proposed that NWP organizer Mary Winsor,
who was vacationing at the Islesboro Inn in Dark Harbor, could be of
some service. Winsor had graduated from Bryn Mawr College the year
previously and was a veteran of the picket line, having been one of the
women sentenced to sixty days in the Occuquan workhouse back in
Florence Brooks Whitehouse 
Anti-suffragists in Maine formed
the Maine Association Opposed to
Suffrage for Women, which publi-
cized its cause with stamps and
other ephemera. In 1919, anti-suf-
fragists hoped for a citizen’s refer-
endum on the question of women’s
suffrage. Maine Historical Society
Collections.
1917. She was very agreeable to making hers a working vacation, offering
to speak at meetings in Bar Harbor and the surrounding towns if they
could be arranged.32 Paul sent Winsor some photos of the Occuquan
workhouse and the suffragists who had been imprisoned there, so the
audience could see as well as hear about that experience. In the end,
though, Florence said she was too busy to set anything up for Winsor.
The Maine NWP had no local branch in Bar Harbor, so organizing a
meeting would have required a stay of several days; Florence had neither
the time nor the inclination to do so. If she had a limited amount of time
to spend touring the state on suffrage business that summer she wished
to do it in the companionship of Abby Scott Baker. Reluctantly, Paul ad-
vised Winsor to focus her energies on persuading Governor Milliken
and other key political leaders to schedule a special session as soon as
possible to ratify the federal amendment.33
By the end of July the exact situation with regard to Maine’s ratifica-
tion campaign was confusing. There were two conflicting viewpoints.
On the one hand, Florence was confident that the situation was well in
hand; she resisted Winsor’s (and Paul’s) urging to try to ratify immedi-
ately. “It is absolutely impossible to get a special session of the legislature
before October,” she insisted in a letter to Paul. “There cannot be a refer-
endum on the Presidential Suffrage bill before November or December
and the Gov has promised to call one for the ratification before the other
if the other is inevitable so I do not think it is wise to push for any other
session.” She and her husband were about to set sail for their summer
house on Squirrel Island for their first real vacation in two years, evi-
dence that Florence felt there was so little cause for alarm that she was
prepared to take a few days off. 34
Winsor had some different intelligence and plainly thought Flo-
rence’s information was suspect. Her informant was state senator Willis
A. Ricker of Castine, who was not a suffrage supporter. Ricker assured
Winsor that the presidential suffrage referendum would be scheduled in
September since a special election had already been called at that time.
In fact, according to Ricker, there was no other option. “The Governor is
legally obliged to call on the election to be held within 30 days after the
requisite number of names have been obtained,” Winsor reported back
to NWP Headquarters in early August. She wrote further that Ricker be-
lieved the legislature’s special session to ratify the federal amendment
was now scheduled for October 8, which meant that the referendum on
presidential suffrage would already have taken place by the time it oc-
curred. If the voters rejected presidential suffrage in September, Ricker
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thought the legislature would be unlikely to ratify the federal amend-
ment, exactly as Florence had predicted. Winsor was a little miffed that
Florence preferred to work with Baker. “Mrs. Whitehouse seemed to
think that it would be impossible for her [sic] to get up any meetings for
me in Maine at this time of year and that the best results would be ob-
tained if she took Mrs. Baker to see the Governor etc,” Winsor wrote to
Mabel Vernon, then the National Secretary for the NWP. Winsor
thought Florence was not adequately focused and required some addi-
tional direction from headquarters. “I should advise you to urge on Mrs.
Whitehouse,” Winsor wrote.35
Naturally, Winsor’s letter resulted in considerable alarm at NWP
headquarters, and Paul promptly urged her to take command of the sit-
uation. “Possibly you can direct agitation from your part of the state,
while you are taking your holiday,” Paul suggested.36 Although the task
was difficult, her call to alarm appeared justified when a clerk in the gov-
ernor’s office confirmed, in response to an inquiry from Paul, that the
presidential suffrage bill would be voted on in September’s special elec-
tion.37 Paul immediately wrote to Governor Milliken directly to verify
the scheduling and then fired off letters to NWP organizers Margaret
Whittemore and Dora Lewis asking for their help in what might be a
very dicey campaign to get a special session called for ratification before
the second Monday in September. Florence got a letter too, with a copy
of the letter from the governor’s office to illustrate the peril in which
Maine stood.38
In truth, their alarm was justified. While there had been an initial
wave of ratifications, the campaigns in some states had bogged down
and it was clear that suffragists would be unlikely to secure the requisite
thirty-six states by the end of the year, let alone by September 1919, as
Paul had briefly hoped would happen. By mid-August, fourteen states
had ratified, but twenty-two more would have to do so before woman
suffrage would be guaranteed by the United States Constitution. Nine
states would not have a regular legislative session until sometime in
1920, and an additional seventeen would have their next regular session
in 1921.39 This meant that in most states two campaigns would be re-
quired: one to persuade the governor to call a special session, and a sec-
ond to secure the necessary votes for ratification in the legislature. A
number of governors were opposed to suffrage, so merely scheduling a
special session represented a formidable obstacle in some states. There-
fore it was critical, in a state like Maine where there was substantial po-
litical support for ratification, to prevent anything from derailing it.40
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Florence wrote to Governor Milliken from her vacation home on
Squirrel Island, addressing her letter sweetly to “My Dear Governor.” She
informed the governor that she thought there had been some mistake. “I
shall greatly appreciate being set right upon this matter, and appeal to
you to use your influence and power to get the F.A. [federal amendment]
ratification firmly on the books before the Presidential suffrage bill goes
to defeat, as it undoubtedly will if the people vote on it.”41 For once it
appeared that Maine was in better shape than recent reports indicated;
Florence had been right all along. While Governor Milliken was away at
a conference one of his clerks had given out incorrect information re-
garding the timing of the presidential suffrage referendum.42
On his return, the governor personally wrote to Alice Paul to set the
record straight. “The date of the referendum election on the presidential
suffrage bill has not been determined and probably will not be deter-
mined until after the special session of the Maine legislature which will
be held sometime in the fall,” he assured her.43 Although this was a huge
relief to the suffragists, Alice Paul left nothing to chance. When Margaret
Whittemore, then serving as the NWP’s national secretary, was vacation-
ing in Maine later in August, Paul encouraged her to connect with Flo-
rence and interview the governor about the prospects of a special ses-
sion. The governor agreed to see her, and Whittemore reported that he
was sure the roads bond would pass on September 8, 1919, making a
special session inevitable. If, for some reason, it did not, he was commit-
ted to ensuring that Maine ratified in 1919 and would call a session for
that purpose alone.44
Florence returned to Portland at the end of August, much restored
by her “summer outing,” as she referred to it. On September 9, she wrote
Mabel Vernon to report playfully that the special roads bill had gone
through “with a flourish and now the Governor will call a session of the
legislature to ratify ‘somethin.’” She was pondering what to do next
about the ratification campaign for the federal amendment. “It seems
best to let things go as they are going, for if we try to make a fight we will
stir up the antis… Advise me if you think differently,” she wrote to Ver-
non.45 Governor Milliken called the Maine legislature into special ses-
sion on November 4, 1919.46
The NWP evidently agreed with Florence that the best strategy was
one of watchful waiting, as there was little in the newspapers through
September and October about the impending vote. Florence and Robert
Whitehouse kept in touch with state legislative leaders, and in Washing-
ton the NWP staff did the same, but it seemed that the fight had gone
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out of the antis. The ratification campaign got an extra boost when the
California legislature approved it on November 1, 1919, with a unani-
mous Senate vote and just two opposed in the House.47
MWSA members, meanwhile, were quite confident of victory and
behaved as if suffrage were already an accomplished fact. They spent
much of 1919 preparing a booklet called “The Duty of Women Voters”
and organizing county-level chapters throughout the state to train
women how to handle the vote responsibly. At NAWSA’s request they
had also been writing a history of Maine’s suffrage work, in which
MWSA figured prominently and the contributions of NWP (and Flo-
rence) were pointedly ignored.48 At their annual meeting in October
1919 MWSA officers all spoke as if ratification of the amendment was
assured, and they had to be chided by the new president, Mabel Connor,
to stay in the fight until the end. She reminded them that “nothing
worth having was achieved without effort; reforms do not come auto-
matically…. It won’t come unless we work for it.”49
Thus the suffragists were shocked when, just days before the special
session convened, the Maine Federation of Labor (MFL) issued a letter
opposing ratification of the federal amendment on the grounds that “if
the [Susan B.] Anthony Amendment is passed it Absolutely kills the Ref-
erendum.” MFL President C.P. Smith of Waterville and Secretary H.B.
Brawn of Augusta co-signed the letter and sent it to every state law-
maker. It revealed the surprising fact that “the Referendum Act was fa-
thered by the Labor Organizations; It is our own child. We cannot wit-
ness any attempt to nullify it, Directrly [sic] or Indirectly, without
offering a serious protest and opposing such action by every means in
our power.” Smith and Brawn insisted that they were not trying to influ-
ence the outcome of the ratification vote; they believed that the legisla-
ture should not act until “the people” had the chance to express their
views on the presidential suffrage referendum. Once again, the issue of
states’ versus federal rights had entered the suffrage debate. Maine’s la-
bor organizations had led the effort to establish the state’s Referendum
Act, giving voters the power to rule on legislation through the referen-
dum process. Smith and Brawn wanted to give the people the right to
vote before the legislature acted on the federal amendment. “The Labor
organizations of Maine believe in law and order,” they concluded. “They
demand that in this case the spirit of the law be respected by the law-
makers.”50
National labor organizations understood the connection between fe-
male voters and improved labor laws, and had actively supported suffrage
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for several years. So what was going on in Maine? It is true that Maine
suffrage organizations had never joined forces as solidly with labor or-
ganizations as occurred in other states; indeed, this failure contributed to
the downfall of the 1917 suffrage referendum campaign. But there had
been no prior hint from Maine’s leading labor group of its intention to
oppose ratification. Quite the contrary, it had passed resolutions in recent
years calling for Congress to pass the amendment.51 The pro-suffrage
forces scrambled to find out what was behind this surprise announce-
ment and counter its effects. They had to respond quickly, or ratification,
which so recently had seemed assured in Maine, could be in jeopardy.
Florence sent a frantic telegram to Alice Paul early in the morning on Oc-
tober 29, 1919, explaining the situation and asking for help.52
Paul took the threat seriously and marshaled a swift response. In a
return telegram she urged Whitehouse to contact the Woman’s Trade
Union League in Boston to ask for an organizer to reach out to women
workers in Maine and put pressure on the MFL. The American section
of the International Woman’s Labor Congress happened to be meeting
in Washington at that time, and Paul persuaded them to pass a resolu-
tion calling on Maine to ratify. The National Woman’s Trade Union
League paid to have a copy of this resolution sent to every member of
the Maine legislature. The NWP also mailed each Maine legislator a
copy of the resolution passed by the American Federation of Labor at its
national convention urging suffrage ratification.53 Finally, NWP organ-
izer Elizabeth Kalb was dispatched to Hagerstown, Maryland, where the
Farmers’ National Congress was in session, to urge them to call on
Maine and other states to ratify the federal amendment. They readily
agreed to this and sent a copy of their resolution to every state
legislator.54
Nearly two years prior, in June 1917, the American Federation of La-
bor (AFL) had passed a resolution urging state legislatures to ratify the
federal amendment, and declared it would “do all in its power to aid in
the speedy consummation of this last step in woman’s enfranchisement,
as it has ever aided throughout the long struggle.”55 On hearing from
Paul that the MFL was opposed to ratification, AFL Secretary Frank
Morrison wrote MFL Secretary Brawn to remind him of the national or-
ganization’s position on this issue. He pointedly instructed Brawn what
he ought to do: “Pursuant to the foregoing, your organization is re-
quested to give all possible assistance in having the members of the
Maine legislature vote for the ratification of the measure, when it is
brought up. Hoping to receive a favorable reply.”56
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It was abundantly clear that the suffragists could not depend on any
state to ratify without a struggle, and the incident with the MFL demon-
strated that the antis still had substantial strength in Maine. NWP or-
ganizer Dora Lewis was already in Maine helping Florence with last-
minute arrangements, and Alice Paul arrived a few days before the spe-
cial session opened to assist with the final lobbying effort. On the eve of
the special session, the Maine branch of the NWP held a great “Ratifica-
tion Dinner” at the Congress Square Hotel in Portland. The purple,
white, and gold banners of the NWP were brought out to decorate the
walls, and huge bouquets of yellow flowers were placed at intervals
around the room. There was a celebratory tone to the affair, which hon-
ored the work of Alice Paul and the National Woman’s Party. Florence
presided over the ceremonies and introduced all of the speakers. By the
time Alice Paul got to the “money speech,” her plea for funds to support
the ratification work that remained, the listeners were completely won
over. Within minutes they had passed up to the front the staggering sum
of $815, a remarkable achievement from a small group of people in con-
servative, tight-fisted Maine. It was a stirring tribute to the courage and
tenacity of Alice Paul and her associates in the NWP. 57
Governor Milliken called Maine’s legislature into special session on
November 4, 1919. While the roads bill was an important item on the
agenda, it was clear that the most important business in front of the law-
makers was ratification of the suffrage amendment, which would be
brought up for debate on the first day of the session. Florence, Paul,
Lewis, and several other suffragists from Portland traveled up to Augusta
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to monitor the proceedings. In his opening speech, Governor Milliken
urged the legislators to ratify the federal amendment. It was simply the
right thing to do, Milliken insisted: “it is not a question of how many
women are seeking the right of suffrage and . . . if only one woman in
Maine wants the vote it should be granted her.”58
The Maine State Senate was the first to act on the measure. Senator
LeRoy R. Folsom of Somerset County introduced the resolution and
moved that it be voted on with “yeas and nays.” Opponents made a fee-
ble attempt to derail this. Senator Alfred Ames of Washington County
moved that the issue be referred to the regular session of the next legisla-
ture so that Maine men would have an opportunity to vote on the presi-
dential suffrage bill first. Ames sided with those who believed it was un-
derhanded for the legislature to ratify the federal amendment before
“the people” had their say on the referendum. He saw no difference be-
tween the presidential suffrage bill and the federal amendment. “It mat-
ters not whether she is dressed in a hobble skirt or an evening gown, she
is the same old girl,” he quipped. Senator Folsom had no patience with
Ames’ position. Everyone was well acquainted with arguments for and
against suffrage, he indicated, and there was no point in discussing the
merits of the issue any longer. It was time to get on with the vote. This
they soon did and it easily passed the Senate with a vote of 24-5. It was
an even better showing than Florence had predicted the night before.59
The House proved more difficult, however. The last-minute opposi-
tion from the MFL had the desired effect, and support for the federal
amendment eroded quickly. The suffragists had discovered that MFL
Secretary Brawn was employed by one of Maine’s most prominent anti-
suffrage leaders. His boss had encouraged him to issue the letter, which
reflected Brawn’s beliefs and not necessarily those of the general mem-
bership.60 On Tuesday afternoon, following the successful Senate vote,
with the House scheduled to consider ratification the next morning, Flo-
rence, Alice Paul, and Dora Lewis met with the MFL officers in a last-
ditch effort to persuade them to reverse their position and support the
federal amendment. 61
The meeting dragged on for hours. Secretary Brawn could not be
present for the first part and the women had to content themselves with
exhorting MFL President Smith and Treasurer Fitzgerald to recant. The
officers stubbornly resisted this, eventually leaving to find Brawn and ex-
plain to him what they were being pressured to do. Brawn later claimed
that Fitzgerald absolutely refused to issue a letter supporting suffrage, so
the women concentrated their efforts on Smith and Brawn. When
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Brawn met with them it appears that Florence took the gloves off,
threatening Brawn that he should give up any political ambitions unless
he reversed his stance on ratification. “I was told that already plans were
being made in their vicinities to GET ME, and that in the end I would be
placed in OBLIVION,” he declared dramatically. He refused to yield and
at last the exasperated women turned their attention back to Smith,
who, for whatever reason, was more malleable. Brawn was unsure ex-
actly what arguments against Smith eventually triumphed. “The only
reason that I can see to explain it was that he got cold feet, or his brain
had a storm and refused to stand for his previous act,” Brawn wrote. 62
What arm-twisting Whitehouse employed is unknown, but at some
point it must have become clear to Smith that these angry women were
simply not going to accept anything less than a full retraction. When the
meeting finally adjourned, Florence had a statement signed by Smith
(which she had written for him) placing all the blame for the previous
letter squarely on Brawn’s shoulders, and calling on the legislature to rat-
ify the federal amendment.63 The following morning, as House mem-
bers showed up for their session, each found a copy of the Kennebec
Journal on his desk folded neatly to display a paid political announce-
ment printed boldly in the lower left hand corner of the newspaper’s
front page, which noted that the MFL’s president now supported the fed-
eral suffrage amendment.64
The NWP had scored an impressive victory by getting Smith to sign
this statement, but would it be enough to save ratification in Maine? The
antis were not ready to concede the fight. Their hopes were pinned on
Representative Sherman L. Berry of Waterville, who had led the opposi-
tion to the suffrage referendum in 1917. When House Speaker Frank
Farrington brought the session to order, Berry quickly rose to move that
the ratification vote be delayed until the regular session of the next legis-
lature, just as Ames had proposed in the Senate. He was a split second
too late, however; Farrington first recognized Representative Percival
Baxter of Portland, who moved that the House vote to ratify immedi-
ately. Berry persevered, pressing his motion and protesting that it was
unfair to the people for the legislature to act first. “All through this great
land of ours there is a spirit of unrest, and I think one reason for it is the
forcing down throats of men what they do not want. Why this seeming
haste to adopt the Susan B. Anthony amendment? Are the supporters of
this afraid to trust the people at home?”65
Seeming haste? Susan B. Anthony had first introduced her amend-
ment to Congress in 1878, more than forty years before, and the Maine
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legislature had considered the issue on many occasions since. This was
no rush to judgment; it was the culmination of decades of exhausting
work by millions of suffrage supporters. The answer to Berry’s final
question was clear: there was no faith that the voters would live up to
America’s democratic ideals and support ratification. But, as in the Sen-
ate, the pro-suffrage forces had no intention of debating ratification
endlessly. Baxter urged them to get on with the vote. Speaker Farrington
ruled that Baxter’s motion had precedence over Berry’s and began call-
ing the roll. Halfway through the roll call there had been so many nega-
tive votes that the antis began to smile, anticipating victory. The suffra-
gists watched helplessly as many men who had assured them of their
support voted against ratification. It hardly seemed possible that they
could get this close and lose, especially when victory had seemed assured
just a week before. Towards the end, though, the “yeas” came more fre-
quently and the final tally was 72-68 in favor. Applause swept the room,
lasting several minutes as the relieved suffragists celebrated the end of a
very long journey. A watching reporter observed that the rejoicing prac-
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On November 7, 1919, Governor Milliken held a ceremony to celebrate Maine’s
ratification of the nineteenth amendment. He signed the letter informing U.S.
Secretary of State Robert Lansing of Maine’s vote with a quill pen with feathers
dyed purple, white, and gold, the colors of the National Woman’s Party. Cour-
tesy of the Sewall-Belmont House & Museum, Washington DC.
tically “assumed the proportions of a demonstration” because it contin-
ued so long, perhaps a sly nudge at Alice Paul and the other NWP mem-
bers who were among those celebrating.66
Maine was the nineteenth state to ratify! The antis immediately
called for reconsideration of the vote, and for several tense hours it ap-
peared that this might actually occur. The antis claimed they had lined
up ten House members who would change their vote. Suffragists coun-
tered that fourteen members said they would switch to “yes” if the vote
were reconsidered, but they were understandably leery of putting this to
the test, so they renewed their lobbying of House members to prevent
this from happening. Fortunately, most legislators were weary of suf-
frage and accepted that its adoption was inevitable, so they agreed to let
the results stand.67
Victory was sweet, and Florence was more than willing to savor the
antis’ loss, particularly after they published an article in their weekly na-
tional newspaper, the Woman Patriot, attacking her methods of persuad-
ing President C.P. Smith of the MFL to sign a pro-ratification statement.
“Aren’t they wretched losers?” she joked in a letter. “Their love of vitu-
perative criticism of women in general and some women in particular is
almost beyond belief, and makes one really wonder if its [sic] safe to let
such women participate in full citizenship… I am not going to write
anything more about it for it is not worth noticing but it does exasperate
one to have to deal even so slightly with such people.”68
Florence could not resist one last broadside to the National Associa-
tion Opposed to Woman Suffrage, however. She wrote them a scathing
letter; surprisingly, since it was decidedly uncomplimentary, they elected
to publish some of it. Since many suffrage leaders subscribed to the
Woman Patriot to keep tabs on the opposition, they must have been de-
lighted to read her strongly-worded denunciation. Florence wrote:
There is no money which I expend which I feel is so little worth
while as the money which pays for your publication. There is no time
which I feel is so nearly wasted as the time it takes to read that same
sheet. After I have finished reading each edition of the paper I feel as if
I had been reading the Police Gazette and need a mental and moral
bath. How you women can be willing to be scavengers in a world
which has so many beautiful things in it passes my comprehension,
and incidentally your attitude toward women and toward life in gen-
eral is the strongest argument I have ever seen for anti-suffrage…You
ask for my opinion of THE WOMAN PATRIOT. I believe, with the New
York Tribune, that it is an insult to the womanhood of America, that it
is vulgar, vituperative, and unfair…Only cremation could improve the
future of THE WOMAN PATRIOT. 69
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It was a constant source of frustration and embarrassment to Flo-
rence and other suffragists that the antis were so willing to declare
women unfit for voting, and that they used misleading and sensational
language to dramatize the evils of woman suffrage. Across the bottom of
the first page of this same issue of the Woman Patriot, for example, ran
the statement, “The Anthony Amendment Means Race and Sex War.”
Such inflammatory and exaggerated language had long caused trouble
for suffragists, and Florence clearly relished being able to tell the antis
what she thought of them.
On November 7, 1919, Governor Milliken held a ceremony at which
he signed the letter notifying the U.S. Secretary of State that Maine had
ratified the Susan B. Anthony amendment. In recognition of this historic
occasion, six women were invited to witness the event. Whitehouse
stood directly behind the governor while he signed the document. Gov-
ernor Milliken used a quill pen with feathers dyed purple, white, and
gold, the colors of the National Woman’s Party. This was a ceremonial
pen the NWP national headquarters had commissioned specifically for
ratification ceremonies, and it was sent from state to state as needed.
Governor Milliken was surely aware of what the colors meant, and of
MWSA’s longstanding animosity towards the NWP. He used the pen
anyway, and then added a twist of his own. Following the signing he pre-
sented each woman with a souvenir. The four MWSA representatives
and Grace Hill of the NWP each received a pen made out of steel. To
Florence, in recognition of her leadership and perhaps with a nod to her
outlaw sympathies, the governor gave a pearl handled gold pen.70 The
press reported these minor distinctions between the two suffrage organ-
izations matter-of-factly, without pursuing their meaning any further,
and they were quickly forgotten.71
Ratification did not end the suffrage battles in Maine completely.
Immediately following the vote, the anti-suffragists signaled they would
accept the outcome, but some weeks later they sued the state on the
grounds that Maine’s constitution could only be amended by citizen ref-
erendum.72 Maine was one of six states where anti-suffragists launched a
suit after the state legislature had ratified the amendment, and eventu-
ally Ohio’s case made its way to the United States Supreme Court.73 In
June 1920, the Supreme Court justices ruled unanimously that the U.S.
Constitution provided for state legislatures, not citizens’ referendum
campaigns, to ratify amendments to the federal constitution, so all refer-
enda organized for that purpose were invalid.74 Maine suffragists had to
wait eight long months after their legislature had ratified for the
Supreme Court to rule, during which they could not be confident that
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the results would stand. Since the issue was in the courts there was little
they could do to influence the outcome, but it also meant that they had
to remain vigilant until the matter was decided.
Only after the Supreme Court had ruled and full woman suffrage
had become the law of the land did Mainers vote on the presidential suf-
frage referendum. The state’s constitution had a provision for holding a
referendum vote but not for canceling one; once it was on the ballot, the
voters had to have their say. In September 1920, women helped pass the
measure easily with 88,080 votes in favor and 30,462 opposed. MWSA
leaders were quick to claim the results showed strong support for suf-
frage, which on the face of it certainly seems true. Yet the strength of the
opposition vote was surprising. While less than the 38,000 votes polled
against suffrage in 1917, this was three years later and full suffrage was
already an established fact. There were no exit polls or any other way of
knowing how men and women voted on this issue, but it seems clear
that many Maine men – and women – still did not approve of woman
suffrage. If men alone had voted on the presidential suffrage referendum
before November 1919, they might well have rejected it. Had that oc-
curred, the state legislature most likely would not have ratified the fed-
eral suffrage amendment. Florence and the NWP had been correct to in-
sist that the legislature ratify before the partial suffrage measure went to
the voters.
MWSA leaders never admitted publicly that their radical sister or-
ganization deserved any credit for helping to win suffrage in Maine. In-
deed, it was at this early date that they took steps to expunge the NWP
almost entirely from Maine’s written suffrage history. In the history
MWSA forwarded to NAWSA, Florence’s name does not appear, while
both her husband and her father-in-law are recognized for their far
lesser efforts.75 Nevertheless the intense, last-minute lobbying from the
NWP almost certainly saved the day for the pro-ratification forces.
While earlier polls had shown solid support among legislators for the
federal amendment, the anti-suffragists had persuaded many legislators
to change their position. Public opposition from Maine’s labor leaders
just days before the session began, when it was almost too late to coun-
teract it, very nearly lost them the House vote. Interestingly, while mem-
bers of MWSA were present in Augusta during the special session, the
newspaper accounts make no mention of MWSA activities at all.76
NAWSA sent no national organizers to help with the lobbying effort.77
MWSA members were simply not willing to employ the sort of tough
tactics that the NWP used to deliver the ratification vote in Maine.
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